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Abstract. Designing and deploying a network protocol determines the rules by which end users
interact with each other and with the network. We consider the problem of designing a protocol to
optimize the equilibrium behavior of a network with selfish users. We consider network cost-sharing
games, where the set of Nash equilibria depends fundamentally on the choice of an edge cost-sharing
protocol. Previous research focused on the Shapley protocol, in which the cost of each edge is shared
equally among its users. We systematically study the design of optimal cost-sharing protocols for
undirected and directed graphs, single-sink and multicommodity networks, and different measures
of the inefficiency of equilibria. Our primary technical tool is a precise characterization of the cost-
sharing protocols that induce only network games with pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We use this
characterization to prove, among other results, that the Shapley protocol is optimal in directed
graphs and that simple priority protocols are essentially optimal in undirected graphs.
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1. Introduction. Most modern-day networks dear to computer science—from
the Internet, to the Web, to peer-to-peer and social networks—are created and used
by a vast number of autonomous individuals with diverse objectives. Research in the
design and analysis of algorithms has responded in kind, with an increasing focus on
optimization in networks with self-interested designers or users.
How do we model and analyze selfish behavior in networks? One important genre
of problems posits that some aspect of network resource allocation—such as the rout-
ing of traffic, the balancing of jobs across machines, the division of bandwidth, or
the available network infrastructure—is at least partially controlled by self-interested
network users, rather than by the network designer or manager. Almost all work in
this area studies applications in which resource allocation is completely controlled by
selfish network users. The most common goal in these settings is to quantify the mag-
nitude of suboptimality that is inevitably caused by selfish resource allocation. This
goal is analytic, not algorithmic. One well-studied approximation measure used for
this purpose is the price of anarchy (POA)—the ratio between the objective function
values of a worst Nash equilibrium and that of an optimal solution.
But inefficiency measures like the POA are flexible enough to inform a broader
question: How should we design networks and their protocols to minimize the effi-
ciency loss caused by selfish behavior? A measure of inefficiency provides a compara-
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tive framework for rigorously answering this question—given a set of feasible solutions,
the “optimal solution” is the one with the smallest-possible worst-case efficiency loss.
This approach adopts inefficiency measures like the POA as objective functions to be
minimized in novel network optimization problems. The optimal objective function
value quantifies the unavoidable loss in solution quality caused by selfish behavior,
given the design constraints of the problem.
1.1. Network cost-sharing games. The question of how to design networks
and network protocols to minimize the inefficiency of their equilibria can (and should)
be asked in a range of models. In this paper, we focus on the conceptually simple
but mathematically rich network cost-sharing games introduced by Anshelevich et
al. [2, 3].
A Shapley network design game [2] is defined as follows. The game transpires in
a graph, directed or undirected, with fixed edge costs; these might represent the cost
of installing infrastructure between two vertices or the cost of leasing a large amount
of bandwidth on an existing link. Each player i is associated with a source-sink
pair (si, ti) and chooses an si-ti path Pi to establish connectivity. Given a choice by
each player, the network H = ∪iPi is formed at cost
∑
e∈H ce. The global objective
function is to minimize this cost.
A key assumption in Shapley network design games is that the cost of the network
formed is passed on to the players by sharing the cost of each edge e ∈ H equally
among the players that use it.1 We assume that each player chooses a path to minimize
the sum of its cost shares. Every such game admits at least one pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium (PNE)—a choice of a path for each player so that no player can strictly
decrease its cost via a unilateral deviation [2]. Crucially, the design decision of how
to share the network cost determines the incentive structure and hence the Nash
equilibria of the network design game, but it does not affect the global optimization
problem of connecting all players at minimum cost.
The inefficiency of equilibria in Shapley network design games is largely under-
stood. The POA can be as large as the number k of players, even in a network of two
parallel edges [3]. Better bounds can be obtained by restricting attention to a subset of
all Nash equilibria (see also section 2.2). Considering only the Nash equilibria reach-
able via best-response dynamics from the empty solution, as in [9, 10], the worst-case
ratio—which we call the reachable POA—drops to polylogarithmic in k in single-sink
undirected networks [9]. Unfortunately, the reachable POA remains polynomial in k
in directed networks and multicommodity undirected networks (Seffi Naor, personal
communication, May, 2007). Considering only the best Nash equilibrium (the price
of stability (POS)), as in [2, 3], the worst-case ratio in directed graphs is precisely the
kth Harmonic number Hk =
∑k
i=1 1/i ≈ ln k [2].2
These lower bounds on the performance of the Shapley protocol motivate an
obvious question: Can we design a better cost-sharing protocol?
1.2. Our results: Uniform protocols. Which cost-sharing protocol minimizes
the inefficiency of equilibria in network cost-sharing games? To answer this question,
we must precisely define a protocol design space. Formulating such a design space
requires a number of modeling choices that are inevitably subject to debate. Our
1This method of sharing the cost of a single edge e is the same as the Shapley value of the
corresponding cooperative game, where the players S are the users of the edge and the characteristic
function is v(∅) = 0 and v(T ) = ce for all ∅ = T ⊆ S.
2The worst-case POS of Shapley cost-sharing in undirected graphs is at most Hk, but its exact
value is unknown [2, 16] and could be O(1).
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basic model is characterized by the four requirements listed below and is defined
more formally in section 2. Naturally, a case can be made for or against each of these;
the most obvious pros and cons of and alternatives to these requirements are discussed
in section 1.4, while section 1.3 summarizes our results for alternative design spaces.
(1) Budget-balance: In each network design game induced by the cost-sharing
protocol and in every outcome of the game, the cost of each edge in the formed
network is fully passed on to its users.
(2) Stability: In each network design game induced by the cost-sharing protocol,
there is at least one (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium.
(3) Separability: In each network design game induced by the cost-sharing pro-
tocol, the cost shares of each edge are completely determined by the set of
players that use it.
(4) Uniformity: Across all network design games induced by the cost-sharing
protocol, the cost shares of an edge (for each potential set of users) depend
only on the edge cost and not on the network itself.
The first two constraints are self-explanatory. The third constraint insists that the
cost shares of an edge in a given outcome depend only on the users of that edge and
are independent of which players use the other edges. The fourth constraint ensures
that the cost shares of an edge are not tailored to a particular network. The Shapley
protocol satisfies all four constraints: the cost shares of an edge depend only on its
cost and its number of users and are independent of all other properties of the network
and the outcome. We call protocols satisfying (1)–(4) uniform.
Our main technical result is a complete characterization of linear uniform protocols—
uniform protocols with cost shares that are a linear function of the edge cost (as in
the Shapley protocol). The difficulty of this result stems from the complex stabil-
ity requirement (2). More precisely, we prove a one-to-one correspondence between
such protocols and “direct products” of certain weighted potential functions. Potential
functions are a standard sufficient condition for the existence of PNE [47, 54], but
many games with pure equilibria admit no potential function. The content of our
characterization result is that the only way to obtain PNE via a cost-sharing protocol
across all possible networks is via a generalized potential function approach.
We leverage our characterization of linear uniform protocols to identify optimal
(not necessarily linear) uniform protocols in both undirected and directed graphs. In
undirected networks, it is easy to show that simple priority-based uniform protocols
dramatically decrease the POA relative to the Shapley protocol—from polynomial
in k to polylogarithmic in k. We prove a complementary logarithmic lower bound
on the best-possible POA, which applies even in single-sink networks, demonstrating
that priority-based protocols are essentially optimal in undirected networks. The proof
idea is to use our characterization of uniform protocols to associate “weights” with
the players, and then exhibit a (weight-dependent) family of networks for which the
protocol induces games with large POA.
Our characterization quickly resolves the optimal uniform protocol design problem
for directed graphs: for all of the measures of inefficiency we consider, the Shapley
protocol is optimal. Thus the Shapley protocol, typically motivated by its simplic-
ity and fairness properties, is equally well justified on efficiency grounds in directed
graphs—fairness arises “for free” when optimizing for performance.
1.3. Our results: Extensions. We also study optimal protocol design for
the more powerful class of nonuniform protocols—those that satisfy only require-
ments (1)–(3). More formally, while a uniform protocol is defined as a mapping from
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Table 1.1
Summary of results. Quantities denote the smallest-possible worst-case inefficiency of equilib-
ria, for the given class of networks, approximation measure, and class of cost-sharing protocols. The
abbreviations “U”, “D”, “SS”, and “MC” stand for undirected, directed, single-sink, and multicom-
modity networks, respectively. The Hk upper bound in directed networks follows from [2].
Network Measure Uniform Nonuniform
U-SS POA Θ(log k) 2
U-MC POA Θ(polylog(k)) Θ(polylog(k))
D-SS POS Hk 1
D-MC POS Hk [3/2,Hk]
D-SS POA k k
every possible edge cost and player set to cost shares for these players, a nonuniform
protocol is a mapping from edge costs, player sets, and networks to cost shares for
the players. As we will see in Example 2.7 and thereafter, a simple but powerful way
to leverage nonuniformity is to order the players according to some static property of
the network such as shortest-path distances.
For nonuniform protocols, we cannot rely on our characterization theorem and
instead establish lower bounds via explicit constructions. For single-sink undirected
networks, we show matching upper and lower bounds of 2 on the best-possible POA.
For multicommodity networks, we prove a (nearly tight) logarithmic lower bound on
the best-possible POA via a novel graph construction. This construction has several
additional implications, most notably an information-theoretic Ω(
√
log k) lower bound
for oblivious network design [20, 24] in k-commodity networks.
In directed graphs, we show that even nonuniform protocols do not admit non-
trivial positive results for the POA or reachable POA and thus focus on minimizing
the POS. We show that a POS of 1 is always achievable in single-sink networks and
is not always achievable in multicommodity networks. Unlike all of the other settings
we study, there remains a nontrivial gap between our best upper and lower bounds in
the latter case.
Table 1.1 summarizes our quantitative results for minimizing the POA and POS.
Our upper bounds on the POA trivially carry over to the reachable POA. Minor
modifications of our proofs extend most of our lower bounds on the POA to the
reachable POA as well.
Finally, we generalize our results to a model that includes an “outside option” for
each player, which allows it to opt out of the game at some fixed opportunity cost.
1.4. Discussion. We next discuss the four requirements (1)–(4) in detail. While
our protocol design space is natural and leads to nontrivial problems and interesting
results, we freely admit that there may be alternative, equally interesting design spaces
to explore.
Budget-balance (1) is, of course, the raison d’eˆtre of a cost-sharing protocol and is
the least contentious. It could be interesting to consider some version of approximate
budget-balance; we leave this challenging direction open for future research.
For the stability constraint (2), one line of criticism would argue that it is too
strong: by Nash’s theorem [50], every protocol always induces a game that has at least
one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium by which we can measure the protocol’s perfor-
mance. However, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is a notoriously problematic
solution concept (see, e.g., [52, section 3.2]) and is adopted primarily when there is no
alternative, in games that possess no PNE. When designing the game being played, as
in protocol design, there is due cause for avoiding mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. (A
similar argument applies for the “sink equilibria” of [21].) Analogously, algorithmic
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mechanism design [51] is a field that designs games (largely auctions) that have good
equilibria, and almost all work in the area has sought games with dominant-strategy
(pure) Nash equilibria, a much stronger requirement than stability (2). A second
parallel is provided by work in the networking community on the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP) interdomain routing protocol [53], which can be viewed naturally as
a game (e.g., [15, 19, 23, 44, 62])—while mixed-strategy Nash equilibria always exist in
the induced path selection game, research has focused entirely on the existence of PNE.
One could also criticize the stability constraint (2) for being too weak: pure-
strategy equilibria should not only exist but also be easy to find. Arguably the most
natural strengthening of (2) is to insist that best-response dynamics always converge
to a PNE from an arbitrary initial state. (This has also been the focus of the liter-
ature on BGP, where this property is called “safety” [19, 23, 62].) While our lower
bounds assume only the weaker stability requirement (2), all of our upper bounds are
achieved using protocols that also satisfy this stronger convergence property. Indeed,
a surprising corollary of our characterization of linear uniform protocols is that such
a protocol always induces a game with PNE if and only if it always induces a game
in which best-response dynamics is guaranteed to converge (Theorem 4.16).
The separability (3) requirement precludes any explicit coordination between dif-
ferent edges of a network. This assumption is restrictive but is satisfied by many
important practical network protocols. For example, TCP/IP congestion control with
various packet dropping policies (e.g., [31, 45]) can be informally regarded as separa-
ble in this sense—each edge makes independent packet dropping decisions based only
on the local state such as the current queue length. Finding a natural generalization
of separability that still permits interesting protocol design optimality results is an
important research challenge.
Whatever the merits of the uniformity constraint (4), we thoroughly study the
optimal protocol design problem both with and without it. That said, a protocol
often must be designed without foreknowledge of or assumptions about the network
in which it will be deployed. Uniformity is an appropriate requirement in such cases.
Moreover, uniformity ensures that a cost-sharing protocol remains well defined as the
surrounding network evolves over time. Again, TCP/IP congestion control can be
thought of as “uniform” in this high-level sense.
Remark 1.1. We do not allow cost-sharing protocols that can affect the underlying
optimization problem of connecting all players at minimum cost. This rules out
obtaining near-optimal equilibria for the “wrong reasons”—by increasing the optimal
cost rather than by improving the quality of the Nash equilibria.
Remark 1.2. We restrict attention to network cost-sharing games in which players
have control only over their connecting path. In particular, the cost-sharing protocol
of Anshelevich et al. [3], which allows players to choose endogenously their own cost
shares, falls outside of our design space. However, the network games induced by this
protocol need not have PNE (except in single-sink networks) and can also have highly
inefficient equilibria [3]. For these reasons, the cost-sharing protocol of [3] is not well
suited to the design goals of this paper.
1.5. Further related work. Several previous papers studied network cost-
sharing games [2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16, 48]. All of these considered only a fixed
cost-sharing protocol and did not address the design questions studied here. The
inefficiency of equilibria in other network design games has also been studied; see [61]
for an overview. For other models of network formation and design with self-interested
participants, see [6, 30, 33] and the references therein.
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A few previous papers study how to design protocols to minimize the worst-case
inefficiency of equilibria in models unrelated to ours. Christodoulou, Koutsoupias, and
Nanavati [12] and several follow-up papers [5, 29, 40] design machine scheduling poli-
cies to minimize the worst-case POA in variants of the scheduling game proposed by
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [42]. Johari and Tsitsiklis [35] design protocols for al-
locating a single divisible resource among heterogeneous players and show that, among
all protocols that meet certain desirable “scalability” constraints, the Kelly protocol
[38] minimizes the worst-case efficiency loss. In a mechanism design context, Moulin
and Shenker [49] identify group-strategyproof and budget-balanced mechanisms that
minimize worst-case additive efficiency loss over all possible valuation profiles.
To a lesser extent, the goals of this paper are similar to previous approaches
for improving the price of anarchy of a given game; see, for example, previous work
on pricing selfish routing networks [13, 17, 37] and Stackelberg routing [43, 56, 60].
Our work here differs in its aim to design a single distributed protocol to minimize
the worst-case inefficiency of equilibria over an entire family of games, rather than a
centralized algorithm for improving the POA in a given game.
Finally, the goal of designing a game with good equilibria bears some resemblance
to that of algorithmic mechanism design [51]. In mechanism design problems, however,
there is generally some crucial data, such as players’ valuations for different goods
or resources, which are unknown to the mechanism designer. There is no private
information in the games studied here; instead, the designer lacks full control over
the allocation of resources. For this reason, the problems studied in this paper are
technically very different from those in algorithmic mechanism design.
2. Definitions and examples.
2.1. Network cost-sharing games. A network is an undirected or directed
graph G = (V,E) and a nonnegative cost ce for each edge e ∈ E. A network cost-
sharing game is additionally specified by a set {1, . . . , k} of k players that we identify
with source-sink pairs (s1, t1), . . . , (sk, tk) and a cost-sharing method ξe : 2
{1,...,k} →
R
k
+ for each edge e. A cost-sharing method assigns nonnegative cost shares to the
players as a function of the set of players that choose a path that contains the edge e.
We abuse notation and write ξe(i, S) for the cost share of player i for the edge e, given
that S is the set of players using e.
The strategy set of player i is the set Ci of si-ti paths. In an outcome of the game,
each player i chooses a single path Pi ∈ Ci. The cost of an outcome (P1, . . . , Pk) is
defined to be C(P1, . . . , Pk) =
∑
e∈∪iPi ce.
A cost-sharing method ξe is budget-balanced if for every set S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}
(1) ξe(i, S) = 0 for all players i /∈ S;
(2)
∑
i∈S ξe(i, S) = ce.
A cost-sharing method is automatically separable in the sense of (3) in section 1.2 in
that its domain is simply the possible sets of users—if the users of an edge are the
same in two different outcomes of the game, the cost shares of these users for this
edge are also the same.
The cost-sharing methods determine the incentives in a network cost-sharing game
by inducing a cost function ci : C1 × · · · × Ck → R+ for each player i, defined as
ci(P1, . . . , Pk) =
∑
e∈Pi
ξe(i, Se),
where Se = {j : e ∈ Pj} denotes the set of players choosing a path that contains
the edge e. If all of the cost-sharing methods of a network cost-sharing game are
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budget-balanced, then the cost of each outcome (P1, . . . , Pk) is partitioned among the
players: C(P1, . . . , Pk) =
∑k
i=1 ci(P1, . . . , Pk).
An outcome of a network cost-sharing game is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
(PNE) if no player can decrease its cost by changing its strategy. Formally, the
outcome (P1, . . . , Pk) is a PNE if for every player i and every strategy P
′
i ∈ Ci,
ci(P1, . . . , Pi, . . . , Pk) ≤ ci(P1, . . . , P ′i , . . . , Pk).
2.2. Quantifying inefficiency of equilibria. We aspire toward network cost-
sharing games with relatively efficient PNE. A standard and conservative measure of
the inefficiency of the equilibria of a game is the price of anarchy (POA), the largest
ratio between the cost of a PNE and that of a minimum-cost outcome. When there
are no interesting upper bounds on the cost of all equilibria, a common weaker goal
is to bound the cost of a subset of equilibria. An extreme approach is to bound the
price of stability (POS), defined as the smallest ratio between the cost of a PNE and
that of an optimal outcome. An intermediate measure is what we call the reachable
POA, a quantity defined in [10]. The numerator of this ratio is the largest cost of an
equilibrium reachable via the following process: players enter the game one-by-one
in an arbitrary order, and each picks a path of minimum cost, given the choices of
previous players; after all players have entered, an arbitrary player is selected to re-
optimize its path, given the current strategies of all other players (a “best response”);
when the process reaches a PNE (as it must [2]), it stops. In general, not all PNE of
a network cost-sharing game can be obtained via this process [10]. See [57] for further
discussion and interpretations of these and related concepts.
2.3. Cost-sharing protocols. Formally, a cost-sharing protocol takes as in-
put a network and player set and outputs a collection of edge cost-sharing methods,
thereby providing the final ingredient for a network cost-sharing game.
Definition 2.1 (cost-sharing protocol). A cost-sharing protocol assigns, for
every network G = (V,E) with edge costs c, for every player set {1, 2, . . . , k}, and
every set (s1, t1), . . . , (sk, tk) of source-sink pairs, a cost-sharing method ξe to every
edge e ∈ E.
Example 2.2 (the Shapley protocol [2]). The Shapley protocol always assigns an
edge e of cost ce, the cost-sharing method ξe given by ξe(i, S) = ce/|S| for every
subset S of players and i ∈ S.
More generally, a cost-sharing protocol can assign cost-sharing methods in a way
that depends on additional information, including the topology of G, the locations of
player sources and sinks, and the costs of other edges of the network.
A cost-sharing protocol is stable if it induces only network cost-sharing games that
possess at least one PNE. An admissible protocol is stable and assigns only budget-
balanced cost-sharing methods; such a protocol meets the first three requirements
from section 1.2. Uniform protocols additionally meet the uniformity constraint (4)
of that section.
Definition 2.3 (uniform protocols). An admissible cost-sharing protocol is uni-
form if the cost-sharing method ξe it assigns to an edge e of a network G is a function
only of the edge cost ce and the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Remark 2.4. Definition 2.3 allows a uniform protocol to assign cost-sharing
methods {ξe}e∈E in a way that depends on the number k of players in the game.
A natural extra requirement would be to insist that for every edge e, ξe(i, S) is a
function only of ce, S, and i (and is independent of k). All of our positive results for
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uniform protocols remain valid under this extra constraint, and all of our negative
results apply to all uniform protocols.
Are there admissible protocols other than the Shapley protocol? Ordered proto-
cols form simple, important examples. Such cost-sharing protocols are defined with
respect to an ordering of the players and can be either uniform (independent of the
network) or nonuniform (defined in a network-dependent way). In either case, the
first player in the ordering pays the full cost of every edge in its path, the second
player pays the full cost of every edge in its path not already paid for by the first
player, and so on.
Definition 2.5 (ordered protocols). A cost-sharing method ξe in a network
cost-sharing game with player set {1, 2, . . . , k} is ordered according to σ, where σ is
a permutation of the players if for every S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k} and i ∈ S, ξe(i, S) = ce
if σ(i) ≤ σ(j) for all j ∈ S and ξe(i, S) = 0 otherwise. A cost-sharing protocol is
ordered if, for every network and player set, it assigns cost-sharing methods that are
all ordered according to a common ordering.
Proposition 2.6 (stability of ordered protocols). Every ordered cost-sharing
protocol is admissible.
Proof. Budget-balance is clear. For stability, fix a network and a player set, and
suppose the protocol assigns cost-sharing methods that are all ordered according to σ.
Renaming the players, we can assume that σ is the identity. Define P1 to be a shortest
s1-t1 path with respect to c. For each i > 1 in turn, define Pi to be a shortest si-ti
path after zeroing out the cost of all edges of P1∪· · ·∪Pi−1. The outcome (P1, . . . , Pk)
is a PNE.
2.4. Example: The Prim protocol. Ordered protocols can be radically better
than the Shapley protocol in undirected networks; our first demonstration is for a
nonuniform protocol for single-sink networks.
Example 2.7 (Prim cost-sharing protocol). Consider an undirected single-sink
network G with edge costs c, a sink vertex t, and source vertices s1, . . . , sk. The Prim
cost-sharing protocol is the (nonuniform) ordered cost-sharing protocol that orders the
players as follows. The first player is the one with source si closest to the sink t with
respect to the edge costs c, the second player is the one with source closest to the set
{t, si}, and so on.
Proposition 2.8 (POA of Prim protocol). For every single-sink undirected
network and player set, the Prim protocol induces a network cost-sharing game with
POA at most 2.
Proof (sketch). Fix a single-sink undirected network and a player set. Renaming
the players, we can assume that the Prim protocol assigns cost-sharing methods that
are ordered by the identity. In every PNE of the induced network cost-sharing game,
every player i chooses a shortest path Pi between its source si and P1∪· · ·∪Pi−1. The
cost incurred by this player is at most the shortest-path distance (w.r.t. the original
network edge costs) between si and the set {t, s1, . . . , si−1}. Thus, every PNE has cost
bounded above by a possible output of the mimimum spanning tree (MST) heuristic
for the Steiner tree problem when implemented using Prim’s MST algorithm. Every
such output has cost at most twice that of a minimum-cost Steiner tree (see, e.g., [63]),
a minimum-cost outcome in the network game.
Recall that the worst-case POA of the Shapley protocol, even in undirected net-
works of parallel edges, is the number k of players [3].
Remark 2.9 (optimality of the Prim protocol). Standard examples (e.g., [63,
Example 3.4]) give a matching lower bound on the worst-case POA and reachable
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POA of every (possibly nonuniform) admissible cost-sharing protocol in single-sink
undirected networks.
Remark 2.10 (forthcoming lower bounds). Both the nonuniformity of the Prim
protocol and the restriction to single-sink undirected networks are necessary to obtain
a constant worst-case POA. We prove, by completely different methods, that every
uniform protocol has a worst-case POA of Ω(log k), even in single-sink undirected net-
works (Theorem 4.3) and that every (possibly nonuniform) admissible protocol has a
worst-case POA of Ω(log k) in multicommodity undirected networks (Theorem 6.1).
3. Characterization of linear uniform protocols: Overview. This section
describes a complete characterization of the linear uniform protocols as those induced
by the “concatenation” of “weighted potential functions.” The stability constraint (2)
from section 1.2—a complex global constraint on all network games that might be
induced by a protocol—makes this result highly nontrivial, and we defer the proof
to section 5. Section 4 gives several applications of this characterization, including
lower bounds on the worst-case POA and POS achievable by (not necessarily linear)
uniform protocols in undirected and directed networks, respectively.
3.1. Potential-based protocols. We begin with two definitions.
Definition 3.1 (linear protocols). A uniform protocol is linear if, for all ce ≥ 0,
the cost-sharing method it assigns to an edge of cost ce is ce · ξ1, where ξ1 is the
cost-sharing method it assigns to an edge of unit cost.
We often abuse notation and refer to a linear uniform protocol by the cost-sharing
method it assigns to a unit-cost edge.
Definition 3.2 (positive methods and protocols). A cost-sharing method of a
nonzero cost edge is positive if it always assigns strictly positive cost shares to its users.
A cost-sharing protocol is positive if it assigns only positive cost-sharing methods to
edges with nonzero cost.
For example, the Shapley protocol is positive, but ordered protocols are not.
Our plan is to use the two known methods of proving stability as a compass
to map the terrain of linear and uniform protocols. Proposition 2.6 proves that or-
dered protocols are stable by explicitly exhibiting a PNE in every induced network
cost-sharing game. The stability of the Shapley protocol is a more subtle “potential
function argument” [2, 47, 55]: one exhibits a potential function for each induced
network game such that local minima of the potential function are in bijective cor-
respondence with the PNE of the game. To begin our development, do any other
protocols admit analogous potential functions? This question motivates the following
definition.
Definition 3.3 (edge potential). Let {1, 2, . . . , k} be a player set. A strictly
positive function f : 2{1,...,k} → R+ is an edge potential if it is strictly increasing
(f(T ) < f(S) whenever T ⊂ S) and if
(3.1)
∑
i∈S
f(S)− f(S \ {i})
f({i}) = 1
for every S ⊆ {1, . . . , k}.
Every edge potential induces a positive, linear, and uniform cost-sharing protocol;
we call these potential-based protocols.
Proposition 3.4 (properties of potential-based protocols). Let f be an edge
potential for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}. Define a cost-sharing protocol by assigning
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an edge of cost c the cost-sharing method ξ, where
(3.2) ξ(i, S) = c · f(S)− f(S \ {i})
f({i})
for every S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ S. This protocol is positive, linear, and uniform.
Proof. Linearity is clear. The method ξ for an edge of cost c > 0 is positive
because the edge potential is, by definition, strictly positive and strictly increasing.
The method is budget-balanced by (3.1). To prove that this cost-sharing protocol is
stable and hence uniform, consider the following potential function for a (directed or
undirected) network G = (V,E) with edge costs c:
(3.3) Φ(P1, . . . , Pk) =
∑
e∈E
ce · f(Se),
where Se = {i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : e ∈ Pi}. By the definitions (3.2) and (3.3), whenever a
player i changes its strategy from Pi to Qi, the identity
Δci =
∑
e∈Qi\Pi
ξ(Se ∪ {i})−
∑
e∈Pi\Qi
ξ(Se)
=
∑
e∈Qi\Pi
ce · f(Se ∪ {i})− f(Se)
f({i}) −
∑
e∈Pi\Qi
ce · f(Se)− f(Se \ {i})
f({i})
=
ΔΦ
f({i})(3.4)
holds. Hence, every local minimum of Φ is a PNE of the network cost-sharing game—
and there is at least one, the global minimum of Φ.
The Shapley protocol is potential-based with the edge potential f(S) = H|S| for
every subset S of players, where as usual Hk =
∑k
i=1 1/i denotes the kth Harmonic
number. Are there any others? Because of the budget-balance constraint in Defini-
tion 3.3, the answer is not clear. But our proof of Theorem 3.8 implicitly shows that
there are a plethora of potential-based protocols, in bijective correspondence with the
open unit cube (0, 1)k−1 in (k − 1) dimensions.
Remark 3.5 (weighted potentials and weighted Shapley values). Due to the
player-specific scaling factor in (3.4), the function in (3.3) is more properly called
a weighted potential function [47], as opposed to the exact potential function for
the Shapley protocol (where f({i}) = 1 for all i). It is tempting but incorrect to
regard each value f({i}) of an edge potential as a “weight” for player i in the weight-
proportional sharing sense of [2, 11]. The appropriate interpretation is in terms of
the weighted Shapley value [36, 59]; the value f({i}) corresponds to a player weight
of 1/f({i}) in the sense of Kalai and Samet [36]. See also Hart and Mas-Colell [27]
and Monderer and Shapley [47] for similar connections between weighted potential
functions and weighted Shapley values in other contexts.
3.2. Concatenation. Ordered protocols demonstrate that not all linear uniform
protocols are positive. This motivates an operation that combines two cost-sharing
protocols into a single (nonpositive) one. In the following definition, we refer to a
linear protocol in terms of the cost-sharing method it assigns a unit-cost edge.
Definition 3.6 (concatenation). Let ξ1 and ξ2 be linear, uniform cost-sharing
protocols for disjoint player sets A1 and A2, respectively. The concatenation of ξ1 and
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ξ2 is the cost-sharing protocol ξ1 ⊕ ξ2 for the player set A1 ∪ A2 defined by
(ξ1 ⊕ ξ2)(i, S) =
⎧⎨
⎩
ξ1(i, S ∩ A1) if i ∈ A1,
ξ2(i, S) if S ⊆ A2,
0 otherwise.
In words, players of A1 share the cost of an edge as if no players of A2 were present
(according to ξ1); if only players of A2 use an edge, they share its cost according
to ξ2. Ordered protocols are precisely the k-fold concatenations of trivial one-player
protocols.
Proposition 3.7 (concatenation preserves linearity and uniformity). The con-
catenation of two linear uniform cost-sharing protocols is a linear uniform protocol.
Proof (sketch). Arguing as in the proof of Proposition 2.6 shows that concatena-
tion preserves stability; all other properties are obvious.
We can now state our characterization result: every linear uniform cost-sharing
protocol arises as the concatenation of potential-based protocols.
Theorem 3.8 (characterization of linear uniform protocols). A cost-sharing
protocol is linear and uniform if and only if it is the concatenation of potential-based
protocols.
Remark 3.9 (interpretation via weighted Shapley values). As alluded to in Re-
mark 3.5, a positive protocol induced by a potential f coincides with the weighted
Shapley value for the weight vector 1/f({1}), . . . , 1/f({k}) (see [27, 36, 47]). Theo-
rem 3.8 can therefore be interpreted as the following: the linear uniform cost-sharing
protocols are precisely the concatenations of weighted Shapley values.
We provide a full proof of Theorem 3.8 in section 5, after exploring several appli-
cations in section 4. We record here one of the major milestones of the proof, which
is also directly useful in the applications in the next section.
Lemma 3.10 (monotonicity of linear uniform protocols). Every linear and uni-
form protocol ξ for a player set {1, . . . , k} is monotone: for every S ⊆ T ⊆ {1, . . . , k}
and i ∈ S, ξ(i, S) ≥ ξ(i, T ).
4. Characterization of uniform protocols: Applications. This section
presents three results that build on Theorem 3.8: ordered protocols have near-optimal
worst-case price of anarchy in undirected networks, the Shapley protocol has optimal
worst-case POS in directed networks, and PNE exist in all network cost-sharing games
induced by a protocol if and only if better-response dynamics always converges (to a
PNE) in these games.
4.1. Undirected graphs: Near-optimality of ordered protocols. Which
uniform protocol minimizes the worst-case POA in undirected graphs? Ordered pro-
tocols offer some simple but interesting upper bounds.
Proposition 4.1 (POA of ordered protocols). Every uniform ordered protocol
has a worst-case POA of O(log k) in single-sink undirected networks and a worst-case
POA of O(log2 k) in multicommodity undirected networks.
Proof. Consider a uniform ordered protocol for single-sink undirected networks
with the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}. Renaming the players, we can assume that the
corresponding ordering is the identity. Consider a single-sink network G, and define
paths P1, . . . , Pk as in the proof of Proposition 2.8, breaking ties among equal-cost
paths in a worst-case manner. The POA of the corresponding network cost-sharing
game is the ratio between the cost of these paths ∪ki=1Pi and that of a minimum-cost
Steiner tree spanning {s1, . . . , sk, t}.
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An alternative interpretation of the network ∪ki=1Pi is as the output of a natu-
ral greedy algorithm for the online Steiner tree problem: player 1 arrives first and
is immediately connected to t via a shortest path, then player 2 arrives and is con-
nected to the network-so-far via a shortest path, and so on. This process generates
the exact same sequence of paths P1, . . . , Pk. Thus, the worst-case POA of this (ar-
bitrary) ordered uniform protocol is precisely the worst-case competitive ratio of this
online Steiner tree algorithm. Imase and Waxman [28] proved that the latter quantity
is O(log k), and the assertion for single-sink networks follows immediately.
For multicommodity networks, the worst-case POA of an ordered uniform proto-
col is precisely the worst-case competitive ratio of the natural greedy algorithm for
the online generalized Steiner tree (GST) problem. Here, pairs (si, ti) arrive online,
and the algorithm connects si to ti using a shortest path relative to the network
already constructed (with previously constructed edges treated as zero-cost). Awer-
buch, Azar, and Bartal [4] proved that this competitive ratio is O(log2 k); the claim
for multicommodity networks follows.
Remark 4.2 (lower bounds for ordered protocols). Theorem 4.3 below shows
that this O(log k) upper bound for single-sink networks cannot be improved by any
uniform protocol, ordered or otherwise. For multicommodity networks, there is a
Θ(log k) factor gap between our upper and lower bounds on the worst-case POA
of uniform protocols, both in general and for the special case of ordered protocols.
Obtaining a tight analysis of the greedy online algorithm of [4] remains an open
problem, and its competitive ratio might well be O(log k). A proof of such an upper
bound would, of course, close the remaining gap between our upper and lower bounds
for multicommodity networks. We note that Berman and Coulston [8] devised a non-
greedy O(log k)-competitive online algorithm for the GST problem, but it does not
seem to have any implications for our game-theoretic protocol design problems.
Next, we leverage our main characterization result (Theorem 3.8) to prove that
ordered protocols are almost optimal uniform protocols.
Theorem 4.3 (near-optimality of ordered protocols). Every uniform cost-sharing
protocol has a worst-case POA of Ω(log k), even in single-sink undirected networks.
We develop the proof of Theorem 4.3 in several steps. The high-level proof plan
is, given a uniform protocol, to first apply Theorem 3.8 to classify players i according
to their f({i})-values in the associated edge potential f . We then make precise the
intuition that players with similar f -values should have similar cost shares. This
enables a dichotomy lemma, showing that there are either log k players that receive
near-identical cost shares or k/polylog(k) players for which the protocol is close to
an ordered protocol. In each case, we construct a family of networks in which the
protocol induces games with Ω(log k) POA.
We first dispense with a preliminary result: a reduction of Theorem 4.3 to the
special case of linear uniform protocols. Every uniform protocol induces a linear
extension, the linear protocol that assigns the cost-sharing method ce · ξ to an edge
of cost ce, where ξ is the cost-sharing method that the given uniform protocol assigns
to a unit-cost edge.
Lemma 4.4. The linear extension of a uniform protocol is uniform.
Proof (sketch). We prove stability of the linear extension; all other properties
are obvious. Suppose there is a counterexample network in which the linear extension
fails to induce a game with at least one PNE. Appealing to linearity and the density
of the rationals, there is also such a counterexample with rational edge costs. Scaling
the edge costs and invoking linearity, there is a counterexample network with integral
edge costs. Again by linearity, subdividing edges yields a counterexample in which all
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edges have cost 0 or 1. But the linear extension and the original protocol coincide on
such a network, contradicting the stability of the latter.
Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 4.4 also shows that the worst-case POA of
linear uniform protocols is determined by 0-1 networks—those in which all edges have
cost 0 or 1.
Lemma 4.5. For every linear uniform protocol and every k ≥ 1, its worst-case
POA in k-player single-sink undirected networks is attained, up to an arbitrarily small
additive constant, in a 0-1 network.
We can now deduce that the minimum worst-case POA of uniform protocols is
the same as that of linear uniform protocols.
Lemma 4.6 (reduction to linear protocols). For every k ≥ 1, the worst-case POA
of a uniform protocol in k-player single-sink undirected networks is no smaller than
that of its linear extension.
Proof. Lemma 4.5 implies that, up to an arbitrarily small error, there is a worst-
case network G for the linear extension which is also 0-1. Since the original protocol
and its linear extension coincide on 0-1 networks, they induce the same game (with
the same POA) in G.
Conceptually, Lemma 4.6 implies that adding linearity to the requirements (1)–(4)
of section 1.2 would not affect the optimal solutions to our protocol design problems.
Remark 4.7. In preparation for Theorem 4.15 below, we note that Lemmas 4.4–
4.6 also hold, with the same proofs, in directed networks. Moreover, Lemmas 4.5
and 4.6 also hold with the POA replaced by the POS.
We next prove four lemmas that relate proximity in edge potential values to
proximity in cost shares. Henceforth, we write f(i) for f({i}), which we call the f -
value of player i. We first use (3.1) to obtain the following useful expression for the
value f(S) of an edge potential in terms of the f -values of the players of S:
(4.1) f(S) =
(
1 +
∑
i∈S
f(S \ {i})
f(i)
)
·
(∑
i∈S
1
f(i)
)−1
.
Lemma 4.8. Let f be an edge potential for the players {1, 2, . . . , k}, α ≥ 1 a
constant, and S a subset of players with f(i) ≤ α · f(j) for every i, j ∈ S. For every
subset T ⊆ S and player j ∈ S, f(T ) ≤ αH|T |f(j).
Proof. The proof is by induction on |T |. For the inductive step, fix T ⊆ S.
Use (4.1) to obtain
f(T ) =
(∑
i∈T
f(T \ {i})
f(i)
)
·
(∑
i∈T
1
f(i)
)−1
+
(∑
i∈T
1
f(i)
)−1
.
The first term on the right-hand side is a weighted average of the f(T \ {i})’s, which
is at most αH|T |−1f(j) by the inductive hypothesis. The second term is at most
αf(j)/|T | by the definition of α, completing the inductive step.
Lemma 4.9. Let f , S, and α be as in Lemma 4.8. For every two (not necessarily
disjoint) subsets T1, T2 ⊆ S with  players each, f(T1) ≤ α2−1f(T2).
Proof. The proof is by induction on . Lemma 4.8 provides the base case. For
the inductive step, let T1, T2 ⊆ S have size . By (4.1), the definition of α, and the
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inductive hypothesis, we have
f(T1) =
(
1 +
∑
i∈T1
f(T1 \ {i})
f(i)
)
·
(∑
i∈T1
1
f(i)
)−1
≤
(
1 +
∑
i∈T2
α2−3 · f(T2 \ {i})
(f(i)/α)
)
·
(∑
i∈T2
1
α · f(i)
)−1
≤ α2−1 · f(T2).
We can now show that players with similar f -values receive similar cost shares.
For the rest of this section, all logarithms are base 2 (say).
Lemma 4.10 (proximity lemma). Let f , S, and α be as in Lemma 4.8. Assume
further that |S| ≤ log k and that α satisfies
(4.2) α2 log k ≤ 1 + log−3 k.
Let ξ be the potential-based cost-sharing method induced by f for a unit-cost edge.
Then,
ξ(i, S) ≤ α (ξ(j, S) + 2 log−2 k)
for every pair i, j of players of S.
Proof. Lemma 4.9 and (4.2) imply that for every two subsets T1, T2 ⊆ S, f(T1)
and f(T2) differ by at most a factor of 1 + log
−3 k. Lemma 4.8 implies that f(T1)
and f(T2) are both at most f(i) · 2 logk for any player i ∈ S. Hence, f(T1) and f(T2)
differ by at most an additive 2 log−2 k · f(i) amount for any player i ∈ S.
Therefore, for every two players i, j ∈ S,
ξ(i, S) =
f(S) − f(S \ {i})
f(i)
≥ f(S) − f(S \ {j}) − 2 log
−2 k · f(i)
f(i)
≥ ξ(j, S)
α
− 2 log−2 k,
which proves the lemma.
Our final lemma prior to the proof of Theorem 4.3 is a weak converse of Lemma 4.10.
Lemma 4.11 (separation lemma). Let f and ξ be as in Lemma 4.10, and let i, j
be two players with f(i) ≥ β · f(j). Then
(a) ξ(i, {i, j}) ≥ ββ+1 ;
(b) for every S ⊇ {i, j}, ξ(j, S) ≤ 1β+1 .
Proof. Part (b) follows from (a) and the monotonicity of ξ (Lemma 3.10). To
prove (a), we can assume without loss that f(j) = 1. First assume that f(i) is
exactly β. By (4.1), f({i, j}) = 1 + β2β+1 . By (3.2), ξ(i, {i, j}) = β/(β +1). Since this
is increasing in β, part (a) follows.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Consider a uniform cost-sharing protocol for the player
set {1, 2, . . . , k}. We can assume that k is sufficiently large (at least 232, say). By
Lemmas 4.4 and 4.6, we can assume that the protocol is a linear protocol ξ.
Theorem 3.8 implies that f is a concatenation of potential-based cost-sharing
protocols ξ1, . . . , ξm for disjoint player setsA1, . . . , Am, where the protocol ξi is derived
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Fig. 4.1. Proof of Theorem 4.3. Networks that induce games with large POA for uniform
protocols with many similar players and for those with many different players, respectively. In (b),
the precise value of  is different for different edges (see text).
from an edge potential fi. Scaling the fi’s, we can assume that fi({j}) ≥ 1 for every
i and j. We bucket the players of each Ai by fi-values into groups, using intervals of
the form [α, α+1) for nonnegative integers , where α > 1 is chosen to satisfy (4.2)
with equality.
The proof now breaks into two cases. First suppose that there are fewer than
k/ log k distinct nonempty groups across all of the Ai’s. Then, there is a single group
that contains a set S of log k players. Budget-balance implies that there exists a
player j for which ξ(j, S) ≤ 1/ log k. The proximity lemma (Lemma 4.10), our choice
of α, and the fact that k is sufficiently large then imply that ξ(j, S) ≤ 2/ log k for
every j ∈ S. Create a single-sink undirected network as follows (Figure 4.1(a)). Each
player not in S has a zero-cost edge from its source vertex to the single sink t. The
players of S share a common source vertex s, and there are two parallel edges from
s to t, with costs 1 and (log k)/3. The optimal solution clearly has cost 1. On the
other hand, if all players of S share the more expensive s-t edge, then each incurs a
cost share strictly less than 1 and will not unilaterally deviate to the unit-cost edge.
This outcome is therefore a PNE, and the POA in this network game is (log k)/3.
In the second case, there are at least k/ log k distinct nonempty groups. Our
choice of α ensures that αa log
5 k ≥ k + 1 for a sufficiently large constant a that is
independent of k. We can therefore pick one player out of every Θ(log5 k) groups to
obtain a set S of 2p − 1 players such that p is a positive integer, |S| = Θ(k/ log6 k),
and every pair j, h of distinct players of S either come from different Ai’s or have
fi-values that differ by at least a (k+1) factor. We rename players of S so that they
are ordered according to the Ai’s and in decreasing order of fi-values within an Ai.
We next construct a single-sink undirected network (Figure 4.1(b)). Each player
not in S again has a direct zero-cost edge to t. The rest of the network is similar to
a lower bound construction for the online Steiner tree problem [28] and is defined in
rounds. In the 0th round, we add a unit-cost edge (the main path) incident to t. For
r = 1, . . . , p, in the rth round, we bisect the 2r−1 edges of the main path created in
previous rounds with the sources s2r−1 , . . . , s2r−1—that is, each such edge is replaced
by two edges (in series) with half the cost, with a new source vertex between them.
Additionally, we create a shortcut edge between each source added in the rth round
and its neighbor on the main path that is closer to t, of cost 2−r((k − 1)/k)p−r+1.
The cost of all of the shortcuts added in a round is Ω(1). The outcome in which all
players follow the main path has unit cost.
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The outcome in which all players completely eschew the main path has cost Ω(p) =
Ω(log k), and we complete the proof by showing that it is a PNE. Consider this
outcome and a player j using the path Pj . The first edge of Pj is the shortcut (sj , sh).
We next argue that the jth player does not deviate from the edge (sj , sh). Every sj-sh
path other than the shortcut comprises only edges of the main path (currently used
by no players) and edges added in subsequent rounds (each currently used only by
players with larger index). The claim is that player j’s cost shares on such a path
would total at least a (k − 1)/k fraction of the path cost, and this is no less than the
cost incurred on its shortcut. To argue the claim, consider the players with which j
would share edges on this sj-sh path: there are some from later groups Ai (who pay
nothing in j’s presence) and some players in the same group Ai as j but which have
fi-values (relative to fi(j)) that are bounded above by a geometric sequence with
ratio 1/(k + 1). The separation lemma implies that the sum of the cost shares of all
of these players is at most a 1/k fraction of the path cost, which implies the claim.
After player j reaches sh, it shares each remaining edge of Pj with at least one
player of lower index. By the separation lemma, the sum of its cost shares on these
edges is strictly less than 1/k, a lower bound on the cost it would incur for being
the sole inhabitant of some edge on the main path. Thus Pj is a best response for
player j, and this outcome is a PNE.
4.2. Directed graphs: Optimality of the Shapley protocol. We now turn
to directed networks and prove that the Shapley cost-sharing protocol is the optimal
uniform protocol. We first note that the worst-case POA is a useless measure for
differentiating between competing protocols in directed networks.
Proposition 4.12 (POA in directed networks). For every k ≥ 1, the worst-case
POA of every uniform protocol in k-player directed networks is k. The lower bound
holds even in single-sink directed networks.
Proof. Fix k and a uniform protocol. For the upper bound, consider a directed
network and the induced network cost-sharing game. Let (P ∗1 , . . . , P
∗
k ) denote an
optimal outcome with costC∗. Every player i can guarantee itself a cost of at most C∗,
independent of the protocol and the other players’ choices, by choosing the path P ∗i .
Thus in a PNE, the cost of each player is at most C∗. By budget-balance, the cost of
every PNE is at most k · C∗.
The lower bound is provided by the single-sink network shown in Figure 4.2. The
optimal outcome has cost 1 + , where  > 0 is arbitrarily small. The outcome in
which each player i selects the direct si → t path is a PNE (for any protocol) and has
cost k.
Remark 4.13. Proposition 4.12 and its proof hold even for nonuniform cost-
sharing protocols (see section 6.3).
Proposition 4.12 also holds, with the same proof, for the worst-case reachable
POA in (single-sink) directed networks. We therefore resort to our weakest inefficiency
measure, the POS. Anshelevich et al. [2] proved the following tight guarantee for the
Shapley protocol.
Proposition 4.14 (POS of the Shapley protocol [2]). For every k ≥ 1, the worst-
case POS of the Shapley protocol in k-player directed networks is the kth Harmonic
number Hk: 1 + 12 + · · ·+ 1k = ln k +O(1).
Using the technical tools already developed in this and the previous section, we
can quickly prove that the Shapley protocol is optimal.
Theorem 4.15 (optimality of the Shapley protocol). For every k ≥ 1, every
uniform cost-sharing protocol has a worst-case POS of at least Hk in k-player single-
sink directed networks.
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Fig. 4.2. Proof of Proposition 4.12. Every uniform protocol has worst-case POA of at least k
in directed single-sink networks.
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Fig. 4.3. Proof of Theorem 4.15. Every linear monotone protocol has worst-case POS of at
least Hk in directed single-sink networks.
Proof. Fix k ≥ 1 and a uniform cost-sharing protocol for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}.
By Lemmas 4.4–4.6 and Remark 4.7, we can assume that the protocol ξ is linear.
Lemma 3.10 ensures that ξ is monotone in the sense that ξ(i, S) ≥ ξ(i, T ) whenever
i ∈ S ⊆ T ⊆ {1, . . . , k}. Since ξ is budget-balanced, there is a player ik satisfying
ξ(ik, {1, 2, . . . , k}) ≥ 1/k. Similarly, for each j = k − 1, . . . , 1, there is a player ij
satisfying ξ(ij , {1, . . . , k} \ {ij+1, . . . , ik}) ≥ 1/j.
Now consider the single-sink directed network of Figure 4.3, taken from [2]. There
is a sink t, source vertices s1, . . . , sk, and an additional vertex v. Player ij has source
sj and sink t. For each j, there is an edge of cost 1/j from sj to t and an edge of zero
cost from sj to v. There is also an edge of cost 1+  from v to t. The optimal solution
has cost 1 + . On the other hand, we claim that in the network cost-sharing game
induced by ξ, the only PNE has cost Hk. To see this, consider an arbitrary outcome
of the game, and let S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k} denote the set of players that share the edge
(v, t), with the rest of the players choosing their one-hop paths to t. Suppose that
S = ∅, and let ij ∈ S be the player of S with maximum index j. By construction,
ξ(ij , {i1, . . . , ij}) ≥ 1/j. Since ξ is monotone and linear, player ij incurs cost at least
(1 + )/j in this outcome. Since player ij incurs cost only 1/j by choosing the path
sj → t, this outcome cannot be a PNE. Thus S = ∅ in the unique PNE, which has
cost Hk.
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4.3. Convergence of better-response dynamics. Our final application of
Theorem 3.8 is technically straightforward but conceptually interesting. Guarantees
that equilibria (such as PNE) always exist in a family of games are important but lack
predictive power: how do we know that rational players will successfully reach such an
equilibrium? A guarantee that selfish participants converge to an equilibrium through
repeated experimentation is much more compelling than a mere existence result.
Better-response dynamics is a simple and well-studied model of repeated experi-
mentation: while the current outcome is not a PNE, choose an arbitrary player that
could decrease its cost by switching paths, and update its path to a better one. If
better-response dynamics is guaranteed to converge in a game, then the game obvi-
ously has at least one PNE; the converse generally fails (see, e.g., [47]). But Theo-
rem 3.8 implies a converse of sorts for network cost-sharing games: the only way to
guarantee the existence of PNE in all such games is to guarantee the convergence of
better-response dynamics.
Theorem 4.16 (convergence of better-response dynamics). In every network
cost-sharing game induced by a linear and uniform protocol, better-response dynamics
always converges to a PNE.
Proof. First consider a potential-based protocol ξ for a player set {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Every network cost-sharing game induced by ξ admits a weighted potential function Φ,
given in (3.3), and every time a player changes its path in better-response dynamics, Φ
strictly decreases (3.4). Since there are only finitely many outcomes, better-response
dynamics must terminate.
For an arbitrary linear and uniform protocol ξ, we can apply Theorem 3.8 to
express ξ as the concatenation of potential-based protocols ξ1, . . . , ξm for disjoint
player sets A1, . . . , Am. Players of A1 are unaffected by the choices of other players,
so the above argument can be applied to ξ1 and A1 to conclude that, in an arbitrary
network cost-sharing game induced by ξ, better-response dynamics eventually reaches
an outcome from which no player of A1 has an incentive to switch paths. This property
cannot be violated by subsequent moves by players from A2, . . . , Am, so no player ofA1
will ever change paths again. Proceeding inductively on the Ai’s, we conclude that
better-response dynamics eventually terminates.
Theorem 4.16 implies that, for linear protocols, strengthening the stability con-
straint (2) in section 1.2 to require the convergence of better-response dynamics has
no effect on the protocol design space.
5. Characterization of uniform protocols: The proof. This section pre-
sents a proof of Theorem 3.8. The “if” direction is immediate from Propositions 3.4
and 3.7. The four major milestones of the “only if” direction are as follows.
1. Every linear and uniform protocol ξ must be monotone in the sense that
ξ(i, S) ≥ ξ(i, T ) whenever i ∈ S ⊆ T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}. (Recall Lemma 3.10.)
2. For every linear and uniform protocol ξ, the players can be partitioned into
ordered equivalence classes so that ξ(i, S) > 0 if and only if i belongs to the
lowest-indexed class that intersects S. Different equivalence classes corre-
spond to disjoint player sets that are combined via concatenation.
3. For every linear and uniform protocol ξ that is also positive, all of its cost
shares are uniquely determined by the k− 1 pairwise cost shares ξ(1, {1, 2}),
ξ(1, {1, 3}), . . . , ξ(1, {1, k}).
4. For every linear and uniform protocol ξ that is also positive, ξ is potential-
based.
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Fig. 5.1. Network in the proofs of Lemmas 5.1 and 5.4.
We work with undirected networks throughout the proof. Our proof can be modified
trivially to use only directed networks.
Our first technical lemma builds toward the first milestone of the proof by showing
that any failures of monotonicity in a linear uniform protocol must be “symmetric.”
The proof of this lemma also develops arguments crucial to the second milestone of
the proof of Theorem 3.8 (see Lemma 5.4, below).
Lemma 5.1. Let ξ be a linear and uniform cost-sharing protocol with player set
{1, 2, . . . , k}. Let S be a nonempty set of players and i and j distinct players not in S,
and suppose that ξ(i, S ∪ {i}) < ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}). Then ξ(j, S ∪ {j}) ≤ ξ(j, S ∪ {i, j}).
Proof. Fix ξ, i, j, and S, and assume that ξ(i, S ∪ {i}) < ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}); in
particular, ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}) > 0. The heart of the proof is the following claim: for all
positive constants α and β, if
(5.1) α (ξ(i, S ∪ {i})− ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j})) < β (ξ(i, {i})− ξ(i, {i, j})) ,
then
(5.2) α (ξ(j, S ∪ {j})− ξ(j, S ∪ {i, j})) ≤ β (ξ(j, {j})− ξ(j, {i, j})) .
To see why the claim implies the lemma, set β = 1. Since ξ(i, {i}) = 1 and
ξ(i, {i, j}) ≤ 1, the right-hand side of (5.1) is nonnegative. Since ξ(i, S ∪ {i}) <
ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}) by assumption, inequality (5.1) holds for all values of α > 0. By the
claim, inequality (5.2) holds for every α > 0. Since the right-hand side of (5.2) is
nonnegative, we conclude that ξ(j, S ∪ {j}) ≤ ξ(j, S ∪ {i, j}).
To prove the claim, fix α and β, and consider the network shown in Figure 5.1.
All players of S have source s and sink t. Players outside S ∪ {i, j} are confined to a
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different, disjoint subnetwork. The parameter M is sufficiently large relative to α, β,
and 1/ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}). The parameter A is at least M2; its precise value will be fixed
later. We show that if the claim fails, then we can choose edge costs so that the game
induced by ξ in this network has no PNE, thereby contradicting the stability of ξ.
We first argue that, at equilibrium, no player chooses a path containing both the
edges (si, u) and (si, v). This is true for player i because it must choose a simple si-ti
path. For a contradiction, assume that at least one player of S ∪ {j} chooses a path
containing both these edges, and let e be one of the two edges that is not used by
player i. By budget-balance, one of the players using e must pay at least M2/k for
it. No player of S will incur such a large cost share at equilibrium because of the
deviation s → u → w → x → v → t (assuming M is sufficiently large). Player j will
not incur such a cost share at equilibrium because the w-v subpath of its path that
contains e can be replaced by the subpath v → x → w (removing the resulting cycles
if necessary) to decrease its cost. Thus no player will use edge e in a PNE.
A similar argument shows that no player will use the edges (y, ti) and (z, ti) in
a PNE. Thus no player other than i uses an edge incident to si or ti in a PNE. So,
player j uses either the path sj → v → x → w → y → tj (denoted Q1) or the one-hop
path sj → tj (denoted Q2) in a PNE.
Next we argue that no player of S ∪ {i} uses the edge (sj , tj) in a PNE. Player j
uses at most two of the three edges (tj , y), (sj , tj), and (v, sj). If any players of S∪{i}
use the edge (sj , tj), one of them incurs a cost share of at least M
2/k for one of these
three edges. (Recall that A is at least M2.) As above, no player of S will incur such
a large cost share in a PNE. If player i incurs a cost share of at least M2/k on these
edges, then its overall cost is at least M2(2 + 1/k)−  (since no players other than i
use edges incident to si or ti). Since player i can guarantee itself a cost of at most
2M2 + α+ β − , this cannot occur in a PNE, provided M is sufficiently large.
Summarizing, player j will take path Q1 or Q2 in a PNE, and all players of S
will follow the path s → u → w → x → v → t. Let P1 and P2 denote the si-ti paths
si → u → w → y → ti and si → v → x → z → ti, respectively. If player j chooses
path Q1, then our assumption that ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}) > 0 implies that player i will not
use the edge (w, x) in a PNE (assuming M is sufficiently large) and hence uses P1
or P2. If player j chooses path Q2, then the cost incurred by player i on path P2 is no
more than that on any other si-ti path. Thus, if there is a PNE, there is one in which
player i chooses either P1 or P2. We label the four candidates for a PNE according
to the paths selected by players i and j, and we proceed to choose parameters to rule
them out.
We have cj(P1, Q2) = cj(P2, Q2) = A, and
ci(P1, Q1) = 2M
2 + αξ(i, S ∪ {i}) + βξ(i, {i, j}),
ci(P2, Q1) = 2M
2 + αξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}) + β − ,
ci(P1, Q2) = 2M
2 + αξ(i, S ∪ {i}) + β,
ci(P2, Q2) = 2M
2 + αξ(i, S ∪ {i}) + β − ,
cj(P1, Q1) = 2M
2 +Mξ(j, S ∪ {j}) + αξ(j, S ∪ {j}) + βξ(j, {i, j}),
cj(P2, Q1) = 2M
2 +Mξ(j, S ∪ {j}) + αξ(j, S ∪ {i, j}) + β.
If (5.1) holds and  is sufficiently small, then ci(P1, Q1) < ci(P2, Q1). If (5.2) fails,
then we can set the cost of edge (sj , tj) to be a number A satisfying cj(P2, Q1) < A <
cj(P1, Q1), and we obtain a network game induced by ξ with no PNE: player i wants
to deviate from (P2, Q1) and (P1, Q2), while player j wants to deviate from (P1, Q1)
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Fig. 5.2. Network in the proof of Lemma 5.2.
and (P2, Q2). (Note that A ≥ M2, as required.) This contradicts the stability of ξ,
completing the proof.
The next lemma is a restatement of Lemma 3.10 and establishes the monotonicity
of linear uniform protocols.
Lemma 5.2 (monotonicity of linear uniform protocols). Every linear and uniform
protocol ξ for a player set {1, . . . , k} is monotone: for every S ⊆ T ⊆ {1, . . . , k} and
i ∈ S, ξ(i, S) ≥ ξ(i, T ).
Proof. We show if ξ is linear and uniform but not monotone, then it is not stable
(a contradiction). By definition, if ξ is not monotone, there is a set S ⊆ {1, . . . , k}
and a pair i, i′ ∈ S of players such that ξ(i, S \ {i′}) < ξ(i, S). This can only occur
if S contains a player other than i, i′. Among all such sets, choose one of minimum-
possible cardinality. Applying Lemma 5.1 with S replaced by S \ {i, i′} shows that
ξ(i′, S \ {i}) ≤ ξ(i′, S).
Since the cost-sharing method ξ is budget-balanced, we have∑
j∈S\{i}
ξ(j, S\{i}) +
∑
j∈S\{i′}
ξ(j, S\{i′}) = 2 =
∑
j∈S
ξ(j, S) +
∑
j∈S\{i,i′}
ξ(j, S\{i, i′}).
Thus,
ξ(i, S) + ξ(i′, S) +
∑
j∈S\{i,i′}
[ξ(j, S) + ξ(j, S \ {i, i′})]
= ξ(i, S \ {i′}) + ξ(i′, S \ {i}) +
∑
j∈S\{i,i′}
[ξ(j, S \ {i}) + ξ(j, S \ {i′})] .
Since ξ(i, S \ {i′}) < ξ(i, S) and ξ(i′, S \ {i}) ≤ ξ(i′, S), there is a player j ∈ S \ {i, i′},
with
ξ(j, S) + ξ(j, S \ {i, i′}) < ξ(j, S \ {i}) + ξ(j, S \ {i′}).
Now consider the network shown in Figure 5.2. All players of S \ {i, i′, j} have
source s and sink t. As in the proof of Lemma 5.1, players outside of S are confined
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elsewhere. The parameterM is a sufficiently large function of ξ(i, S). (By assumption,
ξ(i, S) > ξ(i, S\{i′}) ≥ 0.) The parameter  is small enough so that ξ(i, S\{i′})+2 <
ξ(i, S). The parameter A is chosen to satisfy
(5.3) 2M2 +Mξ(j, S \ {i}) + ξ(j, S) + ξ(j, S \ {i, i′}) < A
and
(5.4) A < 2M2 +Mξ(j, S \ {i}) + ξ(j, S \ {i}) + ξ(j, S \ {i′}).
We claim that the network cost-sharing game induced by ξ in this network admits no
PNE.
First, arguments identical to those in the proof of Lemma 5.1 show that in every
PNE, only one edge incident to si and to ti are used, and no player other than j uses
the edge (sj , tj). Thus, in every PNE, player i
′ must take the path si′ → u → x →
v → ti′ , players of S \ {i, i′, j} must take the path s → w → u → x → v → t, and
player j must take either the path Q1, defined as sj → v → x → u → w → tj, or the
one-hop path Q2 from sj to tj .
Let P1 denote the path si → u → w → ti and P2 the path si → v → x → ti. The
following four statements will complete the proof:
(1) In a PNE, if player j chooses the path Q1, then player i chooses the path P1.
(2) In a PNE, if player i chooses the path P1, then player j chooses the path Q2.
(3) In a PNE, if player j chooses the path Q2, then player i chooses the path P2.
(4) In a PNE, if player i chooses the path P2, then player j chooses the path Q1.
Statement (2) follows immediately from inequality (5.4), and (4) follows from inequal-
ity (5.3). (Recall that in a PNE, no player other than j uses an edge incident to sj
or tj .) To prove (1), suppose that player j chooses path Q1. Since ξ(i, S) > 0 and M
is sufficiently large, player i will not use edge (u, x) in a PNE, and hence it chooses
either P1 or P2. Since the edges incident to si and ti are used by no other player and
since  satisfies ξ(i, S \{i′}) < ξ(i, S)−2, player i strictly prefers path P1 to path P2.
To establish (3), suppose player j chooses path Q2. No players other than i use
an edge incident to si or ti, and the minimality of S implies that ξ(i, S \ {j}) ≤
ξ(i, S \ {i′, j}). These facts imply that P2 is the unique best response of player i
(provided M ≥ 1), and the proof is complete.
Lemma 5.2 and budget-balance yield a useful corollary.
Corollary 5.3. Let ξ be a linear uniform protocol for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Suppose that ξ(i, S) = 0 for some S ⊆ {1, . . . , k} and i ∈ S. Then ξ(j, S\{i}) = ξ(j, S)
for every j ∈ S \ {i}.
The second milestone in the proof of Theorem 3.8 states that, for every linear
uniform protocol ξ, the players can be partitioned into ordered equivalence classes so
that ξ(i, S) > 0 if and only if i belongs to the lowest-indexed class that intersects S.
This and Corollary 5.3 will imply that every linear uniform protocol is the concate-
nation of positive protocols in the sense of Definition 3.6. The next two lemmas work
toward this goal by establishing further restrictions on how two players can influence
each others cost shares.
Lemma 5.4. Let ξ be a linear uniform protocol with player set {1, 2, . . . , k}. Let
S be a nonempty set of players and i, j distinct players not in S, and suppose that
ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}) > 0. Then,(
ξ(i, S ∪ {i})− ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j})
)(
ξ(j, {j})− ξ(j, {i, j})
)
=
(
ξ(j, S ∪ {j})− ξ(j, S ∪ {i, j})
)(
ξ(i, {i})− ξ(i, {i, j})
)
.(5.5)
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Proof. Fix ξ, i, j, and S. Denote the four differences in (5.5) by Δ1, Δ2, Δ3, and
Δ4, respectively. By Lemma 5.2, these are all nonnegative numbers.
From the key claim in the proof of Lemma 5.1 (relating (5.1) and (5.2)), we know
that for every pair α, β of positive constants,
αΔ1 < βΔ4 ⇒ αΔ3 ≤ βΔ2.(5.6)
(The proof of that key claim did not use the hypothesis that ξ(i, S ∪ {i}) < ξ(i, S ∪
{i, j}) and relied only on the fact that ξ(i, S ∪ {i, j}) > 0.) Exchanging the costs of
(y, ti) and (z, ti) in the network in Figure 5.1, an analogous argument proves a partial
converse:
αΔ3 < βΔ2 ⇒ αΔ1 ≤ βΔ4(5.7)
for each pair α, β of positive constants.
We conclude with a case analysis. If Δ2 = Δ4 = 0, then the lemma clearly holds.
If Δ2,Δ4 > 0, then Δ1/Δ4 and Δ3/Δ2 are well-defined nonnegative numbers; the
implications (5.6) and (5.7) imply that they are equal, and hence the lemma holds.
The final two cases are symmetric; if Δ2 > 0 while Δ4 = 0 (say), then (5.7) implies
that Δ1 = 0, and again the lemma holds.
Lemma 5.5. Let ξ be a linear uniform protocol with player set {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Suppose there are distinct players i, j,  such that ξ(, {j, }) = 0 and ξ(i, {i, j}) > 0.
Then ξ(, {i, }) = 0.
Proof. By monotonicity (Lemma 5.2), ξ(, {i, j, }) = 0. By Corollary 5.3,
ξ(i, {i, j, }) = ξ(i, {i, j}) > 0 and ξ(j, {i, j, }) = ξ(j, {i, j}). We can apply Lemma 5.4
with S = {} to obtain(
ξ(i, {i, })− ξ(i, {i, j, })
)(
1− ξ(j, {i, j})
)
=
(
ξ(j, {j.})− ξ(j, {i, j, })
)(
1− ξ(i, {i, j})
)
.(5.8)
By hypothesis and budget-balance, ξ(j, {j, }) = 1− ξ(, {j, }) = 1. Rewriting (5.8)
we obtain(
ξ(i, {i, })− ξ(i, {i, j})
)(
1− ξ(j, {i, j})
)
=
(
1− ξ(j, {i, j})
)(
1− ξ(i, {i, j})
)
.
Since 1− ξ(j, {i, j}) = ξ(i, {i, j}) > 0 by assumption, we can divide through to obtain
ξ(i, {i, }) = 1, which completes the proof.
The next lemma and its corollary completes the second milestone of the proof of
Theorem 3.8.
Lemma 5.6. Let ξ be a linear uniform protocol for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}.
Then there exists a partition of the players into classes C1, . . . , C with the following
property: for every subset S of players and i ∈ S, ξ(i, S) > 0 if and only if i is
contained in the lowest-indexed class that intersects S.
Proof. Define a relation on players by i → j if and only if ξ(i, {j, i}) > 0.
Lemma 5.5 implies that if l → i and i → j, then l → j—i.e., that this relation is
transitive. Interpret this relation as a directed graph H (where the relation i → j
yields the arc (i, j)). By budget-balance, for every pair i, j of players, either i → j
or j → i (or both); thus H includes a tournament as a subgraph. As a consequence,
there is a unique topological ordering C1, . . . , C of the strongly connected components
of H . By transitivity of →, each Ch is a complete directed graph.
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Next, consider a subset T of players and a player i ∈ T \Ch, where Ch denotes the
lowest-indexed component that intersects T . Since i /∈ Ch, there is a player j ∈ T ∩Ch
with i → j, and hence ξ(i, {i, j}) = 0. By monotonicity (Lemma 5.2), ξ(i, T ) = 0.
To complete the proof, assume for contradiction that there is a set T of players
and a player i ∈ T ∩ Ch with ξ(i, T ) = 0, where Ch denotes the lowest-indexed
component that intersects T . Among all sets T with this property, choose one of
minimum cardinality. By the previous paragraph and Corollary 5.3, T ⊆ Ch. (If
T ⊆ Ch, then deleting a player of T \ Ch yields a smaller set with the same cost
shares, contradicting the minimality of T .) We must have |T | ≥ 3: with |T | = 2,
0 = ξ(i, T ) = ξ(i, {i, j}), which implies that i → j and contradicts the fact that Ch is
a complete graph.
Pick j ∈ T \ {i} arbitrarily. By Corollary 5.3, ξ(j, T \ {i}) = ξ(j, T ). By the
minimality of T , ξ(i, T \ {j}) > 0. Applying Lemma 5.4 with S = T \ {i, j}, we have
ξ(j, {i, j}) = ξ(j, {j}) = 1, and hence i → j. This contradicts the fact that T is a
complete directed graph.
Corollary 5.7 (linear uniform protocols are concatenations of positive proto-
cols). A cost-sharing protocol is linear and uniform only if it is the concatenation of
positive protocols.
Proof. Let ξ be a linear uniform protocol for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}. Parti-
tion the player set into classes A1, . . . , Am according to Lemma 5.6. For a subset T
lying entirely in some Ah and a subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k}, we say that S induces T
if S contains no players of A1, . . . , Ah−1 and if S ∩ Ah = T . Lemma 5.6 implies that
the players i with ξ(i, S) > 0 are precisely those in the induced subset T . Corol-
lary 5.3 implies that the values of these cost shares depend only on T and not on S’s
intersection with Ah+1, . . . , Am. For each h, we can therefore define a linear uniform
protocol ξh on Ah by setting ξh(i, T ) equal to i’s cost share ξ(i, S) in every subset S
that induces T . Then ξ = ξ1 ⊕ ξ2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ ξm, as desired.
To complete the proof of Theorem 3.8, we need to show that every linear uniform
cost-sharing protocol that is also positive is potential-based in the sense of Proposi-
tion 3.4. The third milestone in the proof states that every such protocol is uniquely
determined by its pairwise cost shares for a given player (player 1, say): the cost
shares of the player in the k − 1 player pairs to which it might belong. This fact is
proved over the next three lemmas. The first is a calculation.
Lemma 5.8. Let ξ be a linear uniform protocol for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}
that is also positive. For every three players i, j, ,
(5.9) ξ(i, {i, j})× ξ(j, {j, })× ξ(, {, i}) = ξ(j, {i, j})× ξ(, {j, })× ξ(i, {, i}).
Proof. Denote the three cost shares on the left-hand side of (5.9) by x, y, and z,
respectively; the lemma is then equivalent to the identity xyz = (1−x)(1− y)(1− z).
Denote the cost shares ξ(i, {i, j, }), ξ(j, {i, j, }), and ξ(, {i, j, }) by a, b, and c,
respectively. The plan of the proof is to use Lemma 5.4 to express x, y, z in terms of
a, b, c, apply the budget-balance constraint a + b + c = 1, and then solve for x, y, z.
By positivity of ξ, x, y, and z are strictly between 0 and 1.
An application of Lemma 5.4 (with S = {} and i, j as themselves) gives
(5.10) [(1− z)− a]x = (y − b)(1− x);
another application, after permuting the roles of the three players, yields
[(1− y)− c]z = (x− a)(1 − z).
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Solving for b and c gives
b =
xa− x(1 − z) + y(1− x)
1− x
and
c =
(1− z)(a− x) + z(1− y)
z
.
Applying the budget-balance constraint a+ b+ c = 1, we can solve for a in terms of
x, y, z:
a =
(1− z)(x− x2 + xz)
1− x+ xz .
A symmetric argument (with the substitutions x → y, y → z, and z → x) yields a
solution for b:
b =
(1− x)(y − y2 + yx)
1− y + yx .
Substituting into (5.10) and clearing denominators gives
x(1 − y + yx)(1 − z)(1− x)2 = (1− x)(1 − x+ xz)yx2;
canceling through and subtracting x2y(1−x)(1−z) from both sides yields (1−x)(1−
y)(1− z) = xyz, as desired.
Lemma 5.9. Let ξ1, ξ2 be linear uniform protocols for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}
that are also positive. If ξ1 and ξ2 have identical pairwise cost shares for some player i,
then they have identical pairwise cost shares for all players.
Proof. For every pair j,  of other players, the pairwise cost shares for player i
and budget-balance determine the first and third terms on both sides of (5.9). Equa-
tion (5.9), positivity, and budget-balance then uniquely determine the second terms
of both sides.
The next lemma completes the third step of the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Lemma 5.10 (pairwise cost shares determine a positive protocol). Let ξ1, ξ2 be
linear uniform protocols for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k} that are also positive. If ξ1
and ξ2 have identical pairwise cost shares for some player i, then they are identical
cost-sharing protocols.
Proof. We show that for every m ≥ 3, the cost shares of a positive, linear uniform
protocol for subsets of at most m−1 players uniquely determine those for each subset
of m players; the lemma then follows from Lemma 5.9 and induction.
Consider a positive, linear uniform protocol ξ for {1, 2, . . . , k} and a set S of
m ≥ 3 players. For every distinct i, j ∈ S, we can use Lemma 5.4 (with S \ {i, j}
playing the role of S) and positivity to write
ξ(j, S) = ξ(j, S \ {i}) + 1− ξ(j, {i, j})
1− ξ(i, {i, j}) (ξ(i, S)− ξ(i, S \ {j})).
This equation shows that the given cost shares for all subsets with at most m − 1
players and a choice of a cost share ξ(i, S) uniquely determine the cost share ξ(j, S)
for every other player j of S. Moreover, the cost shares {ξ(j, S)}j =i are strictly
increasing with the choice of ξ(i, S). There can be only one choice of ξ(i, S) that
satisfies the budget-balance constraint
∑
j∈S ξ(j, S) = 1, completing the proof.
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The fourth and final main step in the proof of Theorem 3.8 is to show that only
positive, linear, uniform protocols are potential-based. The idea is that every set
of positive pairwise cost shares for a player can be extended to a potential-based
protocol; by Lemma 5.10, this is the only possible extension.
Lemma 5.11 (positive protocols are potential-based). If ξ is a positive linear
uniform protocol for the player set {1, 2, . . . , k}, then ξ is potential-based.
Proof. Given ξ, set ai = ξ(1, {1, i}). Define f({1}) = 1, and, for i ∈ {2, . . . , k},
assign f({i}) so that 1/[1 + f({i})] = ai. Extend f inductively to all of 2{1,...,k}
using (4.1), and let ξˆ denote the protocol induced by f via (3.2). By construction and
(3.1) and (3.2), ξ and ξˆ have identical pairwise cost shares for player 1. Lemma 5.10
and its inductive proof show that ξ = ξˆ everywhere. Since ξˆ is potential-based by
construction, ξ is also potential-based.
Proof of Theorem 3.8. The “if” direction follows from Propositions 3.4 and 3.7.
For the “only if” direction, let ξ be a linear uniform cost-sharing protocol. By Corol-
lary 5.7, we can write ξ = ξ1⊕· · ·⊕ξp for protocols ξ1, . . . , ξp that are linear, uniform,
and positive. Lemma 5.11 implies that each ξi is potential-based, completing the
proof.
6. Extensions. This section studies two extensions to the basic protocol de-
sign problem: relaxing the design space to include nonuniform protocols (sections 6.1
and 6.3) and allowing a player to withdraw from the game in favor of an “outside op-
tion” (subsection 6.4). We also discuss the applications to approximation algorithms
of one of our constructions (section 6.2).
6.1. Nonuniform protocols in undirected graphs. Recall from Definition 2.1
that a (nonuniform) cost-sharing protocol assigns a cost-sharing method ξe to every
edge of a network G. Unlike uniform protocols, the definition of ξe can depend on the
network G and the edge e. We continue to require admissibility (i.e., budget-balance
and stability).
Example 2.7 and Theorem 4.3 rigorously separate the power of uniform and
nonuniform protocols: in single-sink networks with k players, there is a nonuniform
protocol with worst-case POA at most 2, while every uniform protocol has worst-case
POA Ω(log k). We now systematically study the power and limitations of nonuniform
protocols.
This section considers undirected networks. Example 2.7 and Remark 2.9 resolve
the best-possible worst-case POA in single-sink networks, so we turn to multicom-
modity networks. Is a constant (independent of k) worst-case POA achievable by
a nonuniform protocol? For example, there is a natural analogue of the Prim cost-
sharing protocol in such networks: the first player i is the one minimizing the distance
between its source si and sink ti; the second player is the one minimizing the distance
between its source and sink, after all edges in the shortest si-ti path have been re-
set to zero; and so on. Our characterization result (Theorem 3.8) pertains only to
uniform protocols and offers no assistance. Nevertheless, we can devise an explicit
multicommodity example that provides a logarithmic lower bound on the best-possible
worst-case POA of nonuniform protocols.
Theorem 6.1. For all sufficiently large k, the worst-case POA of every (non-
uniform) admissible cost-sharing protocol for k-player undirected multicommodity net-
works is Ω(log k).
Theorem 6.1 and Proposition 4.1 imply that, unlike in single-sink networks, non-
uniform cost-sharing protocols provided little advantage over uniform ones.
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The proof of Theorem 6.1 is based on the following combinatorial lemma.
Lemma 6.2. For all sufficiently large n, there exists a 3-regular graph G = (V,E)
with 2n vertices and a perfect matching M in G satisfying the following two properties.
First, deleting all of the edges of M yields a graph with O(n/ logn) connected compo-
nents. Second, contracting all of the edges of M yields a graph with girth Ω(log n).
Proof. For sufficiently large n, we begin with a 4-regular graph G1 = (V1, E1)
that has n vertices and girth Ω(log n). Such a graph exists due to, for example, a
construction of Erdo¨s and Sachs (see [46, Exercise 15.3.1]). First, we pick a cycle
cover (a 2-regular subgraph, not necessarily connected) of G1; an application of Hall’s
Theorem (e.g., [58, Theorem 22.1]) shows that one exists. Let C1 denote the edges
in this cover. Since G is 4-regular, the set C2 of the rest of the edges of G1 is also a
cycle cover. Since G has girth Ω(log n), C1 and C2 each contain O(n/ logn) cycles.
Letting {v1, v2, . . . , vn} denote the vertices of G1, we construct the following 3-
regular graph G. There are 2n vertices v11, v12, . . . , v1n, v21, v22, . . . , v2n. For every
edge e between vi and vj in the original graph, we add an edge between v1i and v1j if
e is in cycle cover C1 and add an edge between v2i and v2j if e is in the cycle cover C2.
We also add an edge between v1i and v2i for every i and call the resulting graph G.
First, G certainly has 2n vertices and is 3-regular. It also contains a perfect
matching M consisting of the edges (v1i, v2i) for every i. If we contract all of the
edges of M , then we recover the graph G1, which has girth Ω(logn). If we delete
every edge of M , then each connected component that remains corresponds to a cycle
in the graph G1 and hence contains Ω(logn) vertices. Since G has 2n nodes, there
are at most O(n/ log n) connected components after we delete the edges of M .
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let G = (V,E) be the graph described in Lemma 6.2. Let
G1 be the graph obtained from G by contracting the perfect matching M . G1 has
girth at least 2c logn for some constant c > 0. Assign cost c logn to all edges of M
in G. All other edges in G have cost 1.
We add an additional vertex v, and, for every connected component C of G \M ,
we add an edge with cost 2c logn between v and an arbitrary vertex of C. There are
n players in the game, with one for each edge e of M . The end points of e are the
source and sink vertices of the corresponding player.
Now fix arbitrary cost-sharing methods for the edges of G. We claim that the
outcome in which every player chooses its one-hop path is a PNE with respect to
these cost-sharing methods. First, every deviation from this outcome must use either
an edge incident to the extra vertex v or all of the edges of a cycle in the graph G1.
Since all such edges are currently unused by all of the players, the budget-balance
constraint ensures that the deviating player must pay their full cost. Since each edge
incident to v has cost 2c logn and G1 has girth 2c logn, every deviation by every
player incurs cost at least 2c logn. Since every player’s one-hop path has cost only
c logn, it follows that this outcome is indeed a PNE with respect to an arbitrary set
of cost-sharing methods. The cost of this outcome is cn logn.
To finish the proof, it suffices to exhibit a connected subgraph with cost O(n).
Consider taking all of the edges incident to v and all of the edges in G but not M .
By construction, this subnetwork is connected. All of the edges in G but not M have
cost 1, and there are 2n of them. All of the edges incident to v have cost 2c logn, and
there are O(n/ logn) of them for a total cost of O(n).
6.2. Applications of Theorem 6.1 to approximation algorithms. The
construction in Theorem 6.1 is relevant to a number of well-studied NP -hard network
design problems. The most interesting application is to oblivious network design [20,
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24], where the goal is to simultaneously route one unit of flow between source-sink
pairs in an undirected network at minimum cost. The key assumption is that the cost
of routing a given amount of flow on an edge is governed by a concave function that
is unknown to the algorithm. Can the flow be routed in a way that is competitive
with an optimal solution that is privy to this cost function? Precisely, the input is
specified by an undirected graph G with a cost ce for each edge and known source-sink
pairs (s1, t1), . . . , (sk, tk). Given this information, the design problem is to select a
multicommodity flow x that routes one unit for each source-sink pair. An adversary
then chooses a concave function f , and the cost incurred is Cf (x) =
∑
e ce · f(xe),
where xe is the total flow routed across edge e. A flow x is α-competitive if, for every
concave f , Cf (x) ≤ α · Cf (x∗f ), where x∗f denotes a minimum-cost multicommodity
flow for the function f .3
Amazingly, for every undirected network, there is a multicommodity flow with a
polylogarithmic competitive ratio [24]. The construction in the proof of Theorem 6.1
implies an unconditional lower bound that rules out a constant competitive ratio.
Corollary 6.3. For all sufficiently large k, there are k-commodity oblivious
network design instances such that no routing of the demands is o(
√
log k)-competitive
with respect to every concave cost function.
Proof (sketch). We require only two different concave cost functions: a linear
function and a constant function. (A constant competitive ratio is possible for this
special case in single-sink networks [20, 39].) Begin with the network G and corre-
sponding source-sink pairs in the proof of Theorem 6.1, and set the scaling factor ce to√
logn for all edges of M and to 1 for all other edges. Consider the two cost functions
f(x) = x and f(x) =
√
logn, where x denotes the amount of flow on an edge. For
each cost function, there is a routing of the traffic in G with cost Θ(n
√
logn). On
the other hand, every fixed routing of the demands has cost Ω(n logn) with respect
to one of the two functions.
The other implications of the proof of Theorem 6.1 concern the GST problem [1]:
given an undirected graph with fixed edge costs and source-sink vertex pairs, the
objective is to compute a minimum-cost subgraph that includes a path between each
source-sink pair. This is the underlying optimization problem of network cost-sharing
games in multicommodity networks. This problem and numerous variants have been
extensively studied from an approximation algorithms viewpoint.
The best currently known approximation algorithms for the GST problem are
fairly sophisticated primal-dual or linear program-rounding algorithms that obtain
an approximation ratio of 2 [1, 22, 32, 41]. Unlike the simpler Steiner tree problem,
no constant-factor greedy approximation algorithm for GST is known. An obvious
candidate heuristic is the following: iterate through the source-sink pairs in some
order, always connecting the current pair via a shortest path (with already built
edges viewed as zero-cost). The most natural order is to select unconnected pairs
to greedily minimize the additional cost incurred at each iteration; this yields a 2-
approximation algorithm when there is a common sink vertex (cf. Example 2.7). If
this or any other ordering gave a constant-approximation algorithm for GST, it would
also lead directly to the simplest-known constant-factor approximation algorithm for
the multicommodity rent-or-buy problem (see [7, 18, 25]) and the first constant-factor
approximation algorithm for the stochastic Steiner forest problem (see [26]).
3In [24], this version of the problem is called “function-oblivious”; polylogarithmic lower bounds
on the best-possible competitive ratio were already known for the “demand-oblivious” version [24, 34],
in which the sources themselves are unknown.
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Unfortunately, the network in the proof of Theorem 6.1 shatters all of these hopes:
for every ordering of its source-sink pairs, the greedy heuristic above outputs a network
(the matching M) that has cost Ω(log k) times that of an optimal solution.
6.3. Nonuniform protocols in directed graphs. This section studies nonuni-
form protocols in directed networks. Recall from Remark 4.13 that the proof of Propo-
sition 4.12 carries over without change to nonuniform protocols and shows that the
worst-case POA and reachable POA remain linear for all such protocols.
Proposition 6.4 (POA in directed networks (nonuniform)). For every k ≥ 1,
the worst-case POA of every admissible protocol in k-player directed networks is k.
The lower bound holds even in single-sink directed networks.
Proposition 6.4 justifies adopting the POS as an inefficiency measure. Are there
nonuniform protocols more powerful than the optimal uniform one (the Shapley pro-
tocol)? To answer this question, call an outcome (P1, . . . , Pk) of a network enforce-
able if there exists a cost-sharing method ξe for each edge e such that the outcome
(P1, . . . , Pk) is a PNE in the resulting network cost-sharing game. For example, a
POS of 1 is achievable in a network (via a nonuniform protocol) if and only if some
optimal outcome is enforceable.
Proposition 6.5. Every single-sink directed network admits an enforceable op-
timal solution.
Proof. Anshelevich et al. [3], motivated by network design games with endoge-
nous cost shares, prove the following result: there always exists a minimum-cost
solution P1, . . . , Pk of a single-sink directed network and nonnegative payments
{π(i)e }e∈E,i∈{1,...,k} with the following properties:
(a)
∑k
i=1 π
(i)
e = ce for every edge e;
(b) π
(i)
e = 0 for every player i and edge e /∈ Pi;
(c) for every player i and si-t path Pˆi,
∑
e∈Pi c
(i)
e ≤∑e∈Pˆi c(i)e , where c(i)e = π(i)e
for e ∈ ∪iPi and c(i)e = ce otherwise.
Part (c) states that every player simultaneously chooses a minimum-cost path given
the current payments π, with the understanding that the player would have to pay
the full cost of an edge not currently in use.
Given this result, the proof of the proposition is easy. Consider a single-sink
network, let (P1, . . . , Pk) denote the optimal solution guaranteed above, and de-
fine Se = {i : e ∈ Pi}. Let π denote payments satisfying properties (a)–(c) above.
Define ξe(i, Se) = π
(i)
e for every edge e and player i ∈ Se. Define ξe(i, Se ∪ {i}) = ce
for every e and i /∈ Se; this ensures that the penalty of deviating from (P1, . . . , Pk) is
at least as severe as in property (c) above. Define other cost shares arbitrarily, subject
to budget-balance. Property (c) implies that (P1, . . . , Pk) is a PNE with respect to
these cost-sharing methods, completing the proof.
In multicommodity networks the optimal POS can be strictly larger than 1.
Proposition 6.6. For every  > 0, there is a directed network in which every
enforceable outcome costs at least (3/2− ) times that of an optimal solution.
Proof. To illustrate the main ideas, consider the network depicted in Figure 6.1.
The unique optimal outcome has both players sharing the middle route with cost 2.
For this outcome to arise as a PNE with respect to a cost-sharing protocol, the sum
of the cost shares charged to the first player must not exceed 1−  (otherwise the first
player would deviate to its 1-hop path). Similarly, the sum of the cost shares charged
to the second player cannot exceed 1, as otherwise it would substitute one of the two
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Fig. 6.1. A network with POS strictly greater than 1 with respect to every (nonuniform) cost-
sharing method.
Fig. 6.2. A network with POS ≈ 11/8 with respect to every (nonuniform) cost-sharing method.
edges of cost 1/2 in its path. Budget-balance now implies that this optimal outcome
is unenforceable, and the POS for this example is 5/4− .
We build on this example to show for every  > 0, there is a network in which
every enforceable outcome has cost at least 3/2−  times that of the optimal solution.
The base case of our iterative construction is the network of Figure 6.1. The second
network in the sequence is shown in Figure 6.2, and the general process is as follows.
To obtain the ith network from the (i− 1)th network in the sequence, we first “split”
the last player i of the latter network into two identical players, with respective sources
and sinks si, ti and si+1, ti+1. Each of these two players has the same links incident
to its respective source and sink as player i had in the (i− 1)th network, except with
all costs divided in half. Next, we add a direct link from si to ti of cost (i+1)/2
i− .
We subdivide the middle route so that it has 2i sections of cost 1/2i−1 each, with a
zero-cost link separating each such segment. We then add 2i − 1 pairs of new edges.
Each pair has one edge emanating from si+1 and one entering ti+1, and the other ends
of these edges are connected to the tail and head (respectively) of one of the newly
added zero-cost segments of the middle route. Finally, the new edges’ costs are set so
that every si+1-ti+1 path using exactly one positive-cost segment of the middle route
has total cost (i+ 2)/2i.
We now argue that if the first i − 1 players of the (i − 1)th network use their
direct source-sink paths in every PNE (with respect to every cost-sharing protocol),
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then the same property holds for the first i players of the ith network. To see this,
first note that in the latter network, players i and i + 1 are collectively willing to
contribute at most 1/(2i−2) toward paying for the middle route (the optimal shared
path), and this is the same maximum amount that player i is willing to contribute to
the middle route in the (i − 1)th network. This implies that players 1, . . . , i − 1 will
continue to take their direct source-sink paths in the ith network in every PNE. As for
player i, it uses some part of the middle route—at least two consecutive positive-cost
segments—only if it pays at most 1/2i−1−  for these segments. Player i+1 deviates
to a path with only one positive-cost segment unless it pays strictly less than 1/2i−1
for these multiple segments. Thus, player i must use its direct source-sink path in
a PNE. Since the sum of the costs of the direct source-sink paths approaches 3 as
i → ∞, the proof is complete.
We leave open the challenging question as to whether or not every multicommod-
ity network admits an enforceable near-optimal outcome.
6.4. Outside options. We have assumed so far that each player in a network
cost-sharing game is required to choose a path connecting its source and sink. This
section considers briefly the obvious generalization in which each player has the “out-
side option” of not participating in the game, thereby suffering a constant opportunity
cost. Every PNE then satisfies a “voluntary participation” constraint, in that a player
agrees to select a path in the network only if its incurred cost does not exceed that
of its outside option.
Formally, a network cost-sharing game with outside options is specified by the
same data as a standard network cost-sharing game but with an additional constant
opportunity cost ai for each player i. The strategy set of each player i is its si-ti paths,
and also its own outside option. (No player can select an outside option belonging to
a different player.) A PNE is defined in the obvious way with respect to this enlarged
strategy set. The cost of an outcome is the sum of the costs of the edges used by
players that select paths, plus the sum of the opportunity costs of the players that
choose their outside option.
An outside option for player i is essentially equivalent to an additional directed
si-ti edge that cannot be used by any other player. For this reason, the best-possible
worst-case POA and POS in such games (in both undirected and directed networks)
is the same as that in directed network cost-sharing games without outside options.
Precisely, we have the following.
Theorem 6.7 (optimality of the Shapley protocol with outside options).
(a) For every k ≥ 1, the worst-case POA of every cost-sharing protocol in k-
player networks with outside options is k. The lower bound holds even in
single-edge networks.
(b) For every k ≥ 1, the worst-case POS of the Shapley protocol in k-player
networks with outside options is the kth Harmonic number Hk: 1+ 12 + · · ·+
1
k = ln k +O(1).
(c) For every k ≥ 1, the worst-case POS of every uniform protocol in k-player
networks with outside options is Hk. The lower bound holds even in single-
edge networks.
Proof (sketch). Part (a) follows from the proof of Proposition 4.12. The lower
bound in that proof can be simulated with a network with one edge (s, t) with cost 1+,
and k players all with ai = 1.
Part (b) follows from the potential function argument of Anshelevich et al. [2].
In more detail, define the function Φ as in (3.3), with f(S) defined as H|S| for every
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set S of players. This function is defined for all strategy profiles in which each player i
selects either an si-ti path or its own outside option; in the definition of Φ, the latter
can be treated as an edge with cost ai. The function Φ can only overestimate the cost
of a strategy profile, and only by an Hk factor. It follows that the global minimizer of
the potential function is a PNE with cost at mostHk times that of an optimal solution.
Finally, part (c) follows from the proof of Theorem 4.15; that example can be
simulated by a single edge of cost 1 +  and opportunity costs ai = 1/i for all
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
7. Conclusions and open questions. Our work suggests a number of promis-
ing directions for future research. One concrete question is to narrow the gap between
our upper and lower bounds for nonuniform cost-sharing protocols in directed multi-
commodity networks. More broadly, different trade-offs between the constraints (1)–
(4) discussed in the introduction should be studied. For example, can the separability
assumption be weakened in a useful way? Can the trade-off curve between efficiency
and budget-balance be rigorously quantified? What about quantitative trade-offs
between fairness and efficiency in undirected networks?
Finally, as the techniques for analyzing the inefficiency of equilibria in static
games mature rapidly, the more algorithmic and challenging worst-case design ques-
tions should assume a central role in algorithmic game theory research. This paper
presented one study of such problems; we expect similar pursuits in other settings—
from routing, to facility location, to other models of network formation—to be equally
fruitful.
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